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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper draws on a number of projects undertaken recently for the European 
Commission.  It reviews the changing regulatory policies toward bus, coach and rail 
travel in the member states of the European Union.  It is found that although there have 
been substantial reforms in individual member states, reforms at a European level have 
been limited in both their scope and impact.  This is despite considerable activity that has 
included regulation 1893/91 (on public service contracts in local public transport), 
directive 91/440 (on international rail services) and regulation 12/98 (on international 
coach services), as well as a number of Green and White Papers. 
 
Estimates of the economic benefits of commercialising the passenger rail networks, 
introducing tendering for local public transport and deregulating express coaches are 
made.  These are contrasted with estimates of the benefits that might be achieved through 
investing in infrastructure to improve interoperability and interconnection. 
 
Organisational issues are also considered.  Evidence is presented that European railway 
companies should be restructured, with some companies being fragmented and others 
consolidated, with networks re-configured.  The evidence on vertical separation is re-
assessed. For the bus and coach industry, trends towards horizontal integration are noted 
and the anti-trust implications assessed. 
 
It is concluded that continued regulatory and organisational reform is required and that 
this should probably be based on competition for the market for both the operation and 
the planning of most scheduled bus and rail services. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper draws on four projects that have been undertaken for the European 
Commission in recent years.  The first two projects, which both ran from 1996-99, 
examined competition and ownership issues in inter-urban transport.  The first of these 
projects was entitled Strategic Organisation and Regulation of Transport – Inter-Urban 
(SORT-IT).  The second, parallel, project was entitled Managing Interoperability by 
Improvements in Transport System Organisation in Europe (MINIMISE).  These two 
projects had the following objectives: 
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• To develop policy measures addressing the organisation of the European transport 
system in order to improve the efficiency of the transport sector. 
• To design measures to promote interoperability and interconnection, economic 
efficiency and spatial co-ordination of pan-European transport systems. 
 
For those unfamiliar with Brussels-speak, a word of explanation is needed here.  
Interconnection refers to the physical links between transport systems at a variety of 
geographic scales (international, European, national, regional and local). Interoperability 
refers to the technical, economic and organisational efficiency of these interconnected 
links.  For example, European rail systems are plagued by technical constraints, including 
differences in track gauge, loading gauge, traffic control systems and electrical supply 
systems.  However, even where these technical constraints are overcome, rail services 
may be economically inefficient in that service levels are too low and fares too high.  
Furthermore, even if rail systems are technically compatible and the fare:service level 
mix is optimal, there may be problems with service delivery because more than one 
operating company is providing the service.  This is an example of an organisational 
barrier.  To cut a long story short, what the above suggests is that the European 
Commission is not solely interested in the economic efficiency of national transport 
systems but is also interested in the network benefits that might emerge from an 
interconnected series of efficient national transport systems.  Arguably this is an 
externality that is neglected by many transport economists, but equally the emphasis on 
interconnection and interoperability may represent a misdirection of policy stimulated by 
various vested interests and their lobby groups. 
 
The second set of two projects concern competition and ownership issues for urban 
public transport.  The first project was entitled the Improved Structure and Organisation 
for Urban Transport Operations in Europe (ISOTOPE) and was undertaken between 1995 
and 1997.  The second, follow-up, project is entitled Managing and Assessing Regulatory 
Evolution in Local Public Transport in Europe (MAREOPE).  It commenced in 2000 and 
is due to be completed at the end of 2002.  The aim of ISOTOPE was to undertake 
economic and political analysis in order to determine efficiency in urban public transport.  
It was essentially an exercise in comparative statics.  Although it did, at least to my mind, 
identify efficient organisational forms, it failed to identify the dynamic processes which 
produce these organisational forms.  This shortcoming is being addressed by 
MARETOPE which is identifying barriers to change in urban public transport and the 
tools required to overcome these barriers. 
 
The structure of this paper is therefore as follows.  In Section 2, we examine the policy 
background to competition and ownership issues in land passenger transport in the 
European Union, highlighting the key issues and reforms.  In Section 3, we assess the 
policy impacts of introducing competition.  In Section 4, we assess the policy impacts of 
reforming ownership.  Lastly, in Section 5, we draw some policy conclusions based on 
the evidence amassed by the four projects. 
 
 
2. POLICY BACKGROUND 
 
Articles 74 to 79 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome provided for a Common Transport Policy 
(CPT) which has been ratified by subsequent treaties (e.g. Maastricht, Amsterdam).  
However, it required a sustained legal challenge in the 1980s before a White Paper on the 
 3 
CTP was produced (European Commission, 1992).  This was preceded by Directive 
91/440 which introduced a limited form of open access for international rail services and 
required the separation of accounts for rail operations and rail infrastructure.  This in turn 
was followed by directives 95/18, on rail operator licensing, and 95/19, on rail 
infrastructure access and pricing.  This was in preparation for the further expansion of 
open access envisaged by the Railways White Paper (European Commission, 1996), even 
though the White Paper highlighted the limited application of 91/440. 
 
For inter-urban road passenger transport, the most important measure was regulation 
12/98 that introduced cabotage (the ability of an operator in one EU country to ply for 
trade in another EU country) for regular coach services by June 1999.  This followed 
earlier measures that introduced cabotage for non-regular tourist services in 1996 and 
liberalised tour packages in 1992.  
 
Given the principle of subsidiarity – that political responsibility should be devolved to the 
lowest level of governance possible, the European Commission was initially reluctant to 
intervene in urban public transport.  However a precedent was set by regulation 1893/91 
which outlined procedures for public service contracts in local public transport, itself 
building on the earlier regulation 1191/69 on public service obligations.  This was taken 
further by the Citizens’ Network Green Paper (European Commission, 1995) which 
suggested that urban public transport should be subject to standard European 
procurement legislation.  This was re-iterated by a follow-up paper (European 
Commission, 1998) which stated: 
 
“Well designed procedures which introduce an element of competition into the awarding 
of exclusive rights can lead to better services and better value for money.” 
 
The proposed revisions to 1893/91 take this further by attempting to extend contracting-
out and sub-contracting to the bus market and, to a lesser extent, the urban rail market 
(European Commission, 2000). However, there are a large number of possible 
derogations and the proposals are still being discussed.  
 
Hartley et al. (1991) present a useful framework for analysing the impact of regulatory 
changes.  They consider product market competition to consist of four broad types:  
perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, duopoly and monopoly.  
Furthermore, capital market competition (or ownership) is viewed as consisting of six 
broad types: private manager owned, private-stock exchange listed, public sector 
company, government agency and government department.  Figure One presents the 
result of this framework for road and rail infrastructure and for rail, inter-urban road 
passenger and urban road passenger transport operations.  Further details are given in 
Beaumont and Preston (1998) but Figure One refers to domestic European transport 
between 1980 and 1997.  It shows that although rail infrastructure remained a national 
monopoly its ownership status, mainly as a result of 91/440 changed from a Government 
department to a public sector company, with only Great Britain having privatised rail 
infrastructure.  However, similar changes were also reported for road infrastructure, 
although here there was a long tradition of private sector involvement in some countries 
(notably Spain, France and Italy). 
 
With respect to operations, for rail a similar change can be observed as for infrastructure, 
namely a change from government department to public sector company.  Operations 
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remained monopolised except in Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and, at least notionally, Germany (Link, 2000).  For interurban road 
passenger transport (i.e. coaches) there are a large number of providers of regular and 
irregular services, exhibiting features of monopolistic competition.  Mixed ownership is 
important in that the coaching subsidiaries of state owned rail and municipally owned bus 
companies are important players.  Regular express coach services are most important in 
the two countries that have deregulated and privatised the sector, namely Great Britain 
and Sweden, although it is reported that a number of other countries (Ireland, Italy) have 
de-facto deregulation (see, for example, the annex to the report of the European 
Commission, 2000). 
 
For urban public transport (covering buses, light rail and urban heavy rail), the industry 
has remained monopolised but with a change from Government Department to Public 
Sector Company.  The ‘classic’ model of regulated, publicly owned monopolies remains 
the dominant organisational form in ten European Union member states but with a 
number, including the Netherlands and Germany, preparing for substantial change, 
particularly for bus services.  In four countries, limited competition (or competition for 
the market) has become the dominant (although not exclusive) market form.  For three of 
these countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) this is based on route tenders, whilst for 
France this is more usually based on network management contracts.  Lastly, there is the 
well known case of Great Britain outside of London that remains the sole example of a 
deregulated free market, at least for buses.  For light rail in Great Britain, limited 
competition models in terms of long term concessions are the norm, whilst for urban (i.e. 
non national) heavy rail the ‘classic’ model still predominates, although an interesting 
form of privatisation is being proposed for the London Underground.  However, it should 
be clear that the above is a gross simplification.  An alternative taxonomy, suggested by 
Van de Velde (1999) distinguishes between those systems where the right of service 
initiative rests with an authority and those where it rests with the market.  Figure Two 
gives some examples. 
 
The Hartley gram of Figure One can be reformulated to examine changes in international 
operations at the European level by replacing the product market competition categories 
with no cabotage, partial cabotage and full cabotage.  Figure Three shows the results of 
such an analysis for all the key transport sectors and suggests that rail is something of a 
lagging sector.  Moreover, Button (1998) has noted that Europe has not exactly gone in 
for a ‘big bang’ approach to public transport reform.  Whilst there may be some 
advantages of a softly, softly approach in terms of minimising the transitional costs of 
disruption, there is a suspicion that the extend prevarication with respect to public 
transport reforms may be prolonging substantial disbenefits.  It is this issue that we will 
attempt to consider in the rest of this paper. 
 
 
3.    POLICY IMPACTS - COMPETITION 
 
We estimated that in 1994 in the European Union the rail passenger market had a 
turnover of around 21 BECU and the bus and coach market had a turnover of 28 BECU 
out of a total passenger market turnover, including car of 381 BECU (Preston, 1999a).  
Thus land-based, public passenger transport had a 13% share in terms of turnover, 
compared to 16% in terms of distance travelled.  It was also estimated that bus, coach and 
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passenger rail services had costs of around 94 BECU suggesting 51% cost recovery and 
total annual subsidy of around 45 BECU (or around 0.7% of total EU GDP). 
 
The main impacts of competition in the market have occurred in the bus and coach 
markets.  Experience from both Great Britain and Sweden suggests that the unbundling 
and privatisation of bus and coach services can lead to cost reductions of 40%, whilst 
deregulation could lead to increases in demand on competed inter city coach routes of up 
to 50% (Thompson and Whitfield, 1995, Fagring, 1999).  On the road competition has 
had less of an impact on the local urban bus market.  In Great Britain, doubling of bus 
service often only led to a 10% increase in bus patronage, suggesting a market that is 
inelastic to service changes, at least in the short run.  However, in the few cities where 
competition has been sustained in the long run more substantial patronage increases have 
been detected – for example as much as 80% in Oxford (Preston, 1999b).   Overall, bus 
usage in Great Britain outside of London has declined by 34% since deregulation in 
1986, whilst over the corresponding period bus usage in London, where a system of 
comprehensive tendering was introduced, has increased by 13% (Preston, 2001a). 
 
Simulation work undertaken in Sweden as part of the SORT-IT project indicated that the 
main benefit of coach deregulation was that it stimulated the lowering of fares by the 
monopolist passenger rail operator.  This led to a net economic benefit per annum of 0.3B 
Swedish Crowns (SEK) (Berglund and Edwards, 1998).  A similar result had been found 
for Great Britain (Douglas, 1987).  It this result is extended to the European Union as a 
whole, on a pro-rata population basis, a possible benefit of 1.5 BECU per annum is 
identified. 
 
The main source of evidence on competition in the market for European railways comes  
from simulation models.  Preston et al. (1999) in studies of the Leeds to London and 
Gatwick to London routes conclude that head-on competition is not feasible because one 
or both parties make losses but for high-density routes limited entry, in the form of cream 
skimming, may be feasible.  This work has recently been replicated in Sweden for the 
Stockholm – Gothenburg and Gothenburg – Karlstad routes with broadly similar results.  
Simulation work on the Piacenza-Milan corridor in Italy indicates that competition will 
be stimulated if the infrastructure manager adopts an objective of maximising social 
welfare rather than maximising profits, with an approximate doubling of passenger train 
services, assuming no capacity constraints (Shires et al., 1999).  Simulation work has also 
been undertaken for the Stockholm-Arlanda route as part of the ISOTOPE project 
(European Commission, 1997).  It was found that welfare was maximised when services 
were provided by express bus, by the A-train, by SL and by SJ (operating an hourly 
service from Central station and a 20 minute service from Södertälje).  However, this 
configuration was not sustainable as SJ suffered operating losses. 
 
For urban bus and light rail, the main form of competition has been competition for the 
market.  Table One shows some oft-quoted, and somewhat contentious, results from the 
ISOTOPE project that show that the deregulated bus systems in Great Britain have much 
better cost recovery (87%) than either the classic regulated systems or the limited 
competition systems (both 47%) (European Commission, 1997).  However, this is a bit 
misleading as the calculations for Great Britain exclude fuel duty rebate, which is around 
12% of operating costs net of this rebate.  Moreover, revenue includes concessionary 
fares support which constitutes around 17% of revenue.  If these adjustments are made 
then cost recovery becomes 63%.  (Data derived from Bristow et al, 2001).  Moreover, 
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the deregulated British system appears to have much lower costs per bus kilometre, 23% 
lower than limited competition systems and 51% lower than regulated systems.  This 
research was reinforced by modelling work (Preston, 1999c, Wunsch, 1996) that found 
that unit costs in Great Britain were around 50% lower than those in the rest of Europe.  
ISOTOPE speculated that if higher factor prices and labour rigidities were taken into 
account, the cost reductions achievable elsewhere in Europe would be around 15%. 
 
Furthermore, Table One shows that limited competition systems have 8% higher staff 
productivity than regulated systems, if measured in terms of vehicle kilometres per 
member of staff.  However, this is a partial measure.  In order to know whether this was 
efficient or not one would need to know about relative factor prices, in particular the 
price of labour and of capital.  Moreover, if productivity is measured in terms of 
passenger kms then different results are obtained, with regulated systems appearing to 
have 62% higher load factors than deregulated systems and 126% higher load factors 
than limited competition systems.  This reflects both exogenous factors (such as 
population density) and endogenous factors (such as fare structures and levels). 
 
MINIMISE, in a detailed modelling exercise, estimated that the franchising of urban and 
regional transport could have annual net benefits of 6.5 BECU (MINIMISE, 1997).  
Assuming a local and regional bus market with a total cost base of 39 BECU (but revenue 
of only 20 BECU – see Preston, 1999a), this is equivalent to a cost reduction of around 
17%, a figure consistent with the findings of  ISOTOPE and with a detailed study of 
tendering of bus in Sweden (Alexandersson et al, 1998).  It should be noted that the 
MINIMISE study also included light rail and metro systems but these only carried around 
12% of the traffic of bus systems at the European Union level. 
 
 
4.   POLICY IMPACTS – OWNERSHIP AND ORGANISATION 
 
We have seen that the main reform with respect to passenger railways in the European 
Union has been  commercialisation so that railways are now operated as public sector 
companies rather than government departments.  Another contentious set of findings, this 
time derived from Shires and Preston, 1999, are presented in Table 2.  The key result 
(which was also found to be statistically significant) was that in 1994 the more 
commercially oriented railways had 32% higher productivity than the more directly state 
controlled railways.  It was speculated that given total rail costs of 67 BECU per annum, 
extending commercialisation throughout the European Union could lead to benefits, 
through cost savings, of 10 BECU, although some of these benefits would accrue to 
freight operations.  Table 2, however, suggests that, between 1994 and 1997 the 
productivity gap reduced from 32% to 25%, suggesting that some catch-up was 
occurring. 
 
Shires and Preston (op. cit.) also develop a translog operating cost model of European 
railway operations.  It suggests that the industry exhibits a U shaped average cost curve 
with respect to both scale and density.  It was estimated that the mean returns to scale of 
European rail operations is 0.78 (suggesting decreasing returns – the average railway is 
too big) and mean returns to density of 3.22 (suggesting increasing returns – the average 
railway’s traffic is too sparse).  Substantial horizontal separation and/or network 
reconfiguration is required, given findings that the optimal sized network is estimated to 
consist of around 2,900 route kms and 23,000 train kms per route km per annum.  This 
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work suggests that, for example, the British railway network should consist of around 
four or five network operators.  It is somewhat gratifying to see that this is what is 
happening (see Table Three).  Conversely, some smaller rail networks could usefully 
merge with neighbouring networks (e.g. Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark). 
 
Evidence with respect to the vertical integration of railways is mixed.  Cantos Sanchez 
(2001) has shown that track infrastructure and passenger operations are cost substitutes 
(higher track costs will lead to lower operation costs by permitting faster services) but 
track infrastructure and freight operations are cost complements (higher track costs lead 
to higher freight operation costs due to higher maintenance costs).  Although this is 
further evidence of the diseconomies of scope of joint passenger and freight services (at 
least above a certain output level), it also suggests the possibility of benefits of vertical 
integration.  The only empirical evidence on vertical separation comes from Shires et al., 
(1999) who found that, all other things being equal, operating costs in Sweden have 
reduced by around 10% since separation.  Separation in Sweden is based on a publicly 
owned track authority utilising marginal cost pricing principles.  The situation in Great 
Britain is substantially different, being based on a privately owned track authority 
utilising a variant of average cost pricing.  In both countries there is a problem in that the 
track authority is a monopoly.  Else and James (1994) suggest the problem may be more 
severe than this if the operations are provided by area monopolies.  This leads to the 
coexistence of bilateral monopolies (between the track authority and the operators) and 
complementary monopoly (between operators).  This results in multiple marginalisation 
and a situation where prices are higher and output lower than that which would be 
provided by an integrated monopoly.  In Sweden this situation is avoided by regulating 
Banverket so it charges for access according to marginal cost principles and providing 
lump sum subsidy to cover the deficit.  In Great Britain this situation is arguably 
exacerbated by requiring Railtrack to act commercially although it is moderated by price 
and output regulation of train operators (who are also provided with lump sum subsidy 
for any deficits), quality incentives for both Railtrack and the train operators and price 
regulation of Railtrack.  However, the form of regulation chosen (RPI-X, also known as 
price capping) may lead to a dynamic inconsistency where capital costs are sunk.  If such 
a cost minimising investment is made, it is likely that the regulator will ex-post tighten 
the price cap (i.e. increase X).  Knowing this, the regulated firm will be reluctant to invest 
in sunk cost schemes (Helm and Thompson, 1991).  In Great Britain there appears a 
strong theoretical possibility of under-investment, although the empirical evidence is 
more mixed – at least for track, although for rolling stock there is stronger evidence of 
under-investment (Preston, 2001c). 
 
An important advantage of vertical separation is that it creates a level playing field for 
competition in the market, although problems concerning the determination of access 
rights and charges remain.  Moreover, it is argued by some that with appropriate anti-trust 
policy, competition for the market is possible for vertically integrated structures.  
Important regulatory information may be provided by the amount a vertically integrated 
company charges itself for using its own infrastructure and the amount of revenue (and 
operating costs) foregone if it allows the infrastructure to be used by another operator.  
This is the basis for the efficient component pricing rule (Baumol, 1983), although this 
assumes, amongst other things, efficient behaviour by the incumbent monopolist and 
transparent accounts (Jahanshahi, 1998).  Overall, the jury on vertical separation remains 
out, although there is some evidence that the way the British have dealt with this issue 
has been particularly problematic.  SORT-IT’s preference was for vertical integration, but 
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with vertical separation as a possible transitional stage used to help determine railways’ 
true capital costs. 
 
ISOTOPE developed a similar translog model of operating costs for urban bus operations 
(see Preston, 1999c).  U shaped average cost curves were again suggested, with returns to 
scale for the mean operator found to be 0.71 and returns to density found to be 0.86.  This 
suggests diseconomies with respect to both scale and density.  In other words, on 
average, European bus operations are too big and too dense.  Strong substitutability 
between capital and labour was found, whilst input price elasticity for labour was 
estimated at -0.34 and for capital was estimated at -0.18. Overall, it was found that the 
optimal bus operation’s size was a fleet of around 100 vehicles.  If this were true, then the 
British bus industry might consist of 780 equally sized bus companies (Preston, 2001).  
Table Four shows that this palpably is not the case - the top five big groups currently 
control 68% of the British bus market.  Similar levels of concentration are exhibited 
elsewhere in Europe where markets have been freed up (France, Scandinavia). 
 
Our explanation is that large bus firms have some advantages that do not show up in 
conventional econometric studies of returns to scale.  There may be advantages of being 
big in terms of purchasing power, with respect to new vehicles, fuel and capital in 
general.  There may be human capital advantages in terms of the recruitment and 
retention of key staff (particularly managers and drivers).  There may be demand side 
complementarities related to timetable and route coordination, integrated ticketing and 
product differentiation which can only be achieved by large firms.  There may also be 
market power advantages for large firms who can deter competitive entry by threatening 
predation.  This has important, but difficult, anti-trust implications (see, for example, 
Mackie and Preston, 1996, Chapter 7). 
 
In short, there are advantages of being big.  In addition, there are also advantages of 
being small related to more hands-on, locally responsive management, cheaper, non 
unionised labour and, once a critical mass is reached, efficient scheduling of crew and 
vehicles.  Our view is that the bus groups attempt to reap the benefits of being both big 
and small at the same time.  The British public transport conglomerates tend to maintain a 
lean headquarters focusing on strategic functions, with tactical and operational functions 
devolved to the local level.  For bus, this is often the depot level of around 100 vehicles 
or so (Preston, 1999c).  For rail this devolved unit may be somewhat larger, but the same 
broad principle seems to apply. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The reform of land passenger public transport in Europe has been relatively slow.  In part 
this is due to the principle of subsidiarity which, influenced by the seminal work of 
Tiebout (1956), suggests that much of the responsibility for public transport should rest 
with local and regional governments.  However, this assumes that there are no external 
effects between jurisdictions.  With the emergence of a pan-European public transport 
industry, led by British and French conglomerates, this is no longer the case.  By early 
2000, UITP reported at least nine companies acting as public transport operators in more 
than one EU member state, whilst in only four Member States was the provision of public 
transport services restricted to home country services (European Commission, 2000).  
There is a risk that an unregulated public transport monopoly in one member state could 
 9 
compete unfairly in other member states where public transport markets are more open.  
Such international spillovers are clearly of concern to the European Commission, but are 
difficult to deal with through competition law. 
 
Dudley and Richardson (2000) note that four variables are important determinants of 
‘third order’ (i.e. major) policy change: namely ideas, interests, institutions and 
individuals (after Peters, 1996). Of these four Is, there has been little convergence of 
transport policy ideas, interests and institutions at a European level, so that policy 
exhibits something of a hollow core.  There may be a possibility that this empty core has 
been occupied by vested interests, not least from industry, including civil engineering 
firms and manufacturers of public transport equipment.  This in part may explain the 
policy emphasis on transport infrastructure and in particular on the Trans European 
network (see Sichelsmidt, 1999).  It may also explain the obsession with technological 
solutions to problems concerning interconnection and interoperability.  Work by the 
MINIMISE consortium (1999) suggests that such investments may have only modest 
returns, at least for land-based public passenger transport.  Table Five indicates that a 
series of measures to remove interoperability and interconnection barriers in public 
transport at the European level were estimated to amount to 6.7 BECU.  By contrast, the 
continued removal of organisational barriers was estimated by SORT-IT to lead to annual 
benefits of 18 BECU. 
 
We should also not forget the importance of individual agency.  Many domestic reforms 
were championed by particular individuals, whether they be politicians (for example 
Nicholas Ridley with respect to British bus deregulation) or policy advisors (for example 
Christopher Foster with respect to British rail privatisation).  Transport has lacked such 
policy champions at the European level.  Somewhat surprisingly, at least from a British 
perspective, the person who has come closest to fulfilling this role has been 
Commissioner Neil Kinnock. 
  
Overall, our review of the theoretical and empirical evidence leads us to conclude that for 
scheduled urban passenger transport both competition in the market and for the market 
will promote productive efficiency.  However, competition in the market will neglect the 
importance of user economies of scale at both the route and network level.  For frequent, 
turn up and go services there is a case for price and quantity regulation.  This may be best 
achieved within a tendering or franchising framework.  We are attracted by systems in 
which there is competition for the market for the strategic and tactical, as well as 
operational, functions but experience from Adelaide, the British rail franchise re-
negotiations, Helsingborg and Sundsvall indicates how difficult this may be to do in 
practise (Preston, 2001b). 
 
For scheduled interurban public transport, where passengers can book in advance and 
pre-plan their journey, user economies of scale are less important and can be more easily 
internalised.  Price/quantity regulation is probably not required, although residual 
regulation concerning safety, environmental performance and competition policy is still 
needed.  For rail, there is however the problem of the interface between urban and 
interurban operations.  This will be exacerbated where inter urban services are of a high 
enough frequency to encourage turn up and go behaviour.  This suggests that competition 
for the market might also be appropriate for high frequency, short distance inter urban 
routes.  This might be accompanied by the possibilities of some fringe competition, 
particularly to stimulate technological innovation through product differentiation.  It is 
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likely that the potential for this is greater in inter urban than urban markets.  Open access 
competition for passenger rail might be limited to long distance, inter urban (often 
international) services.  This might be stimulated by extension of the Rail Freight freeway 
concept to passenger services, although hopefully with a bit more success. 
 
We thus conclude in favour of competition for the market but we agree that: 
 
“…. it is necessary to resolve questions about the geographical scope of the exclusive 
right, the duration of the contract, its financial structure and assignment of risk.”  
(European Commission, 1998). 
 
For urban bus, we would recommend shortish (3 to 5 years), route based contracts based 
on gross costs but with patronage bonuses and with minimum quality standards 
concerning vehicle age, size and reliability, enforced by penalties.  Consideration should 
be made of contracting out the planning function at the network level. Where there are 
serious land shortages, the Authority should consider providing terminals and depots, 
whilst in extreme cases the Authority should perform the role of a residual service 
provider, particularly where there is concern about market concentration. 
 
For rail, we would advocate longish (around 15-20 years), area based, vertically 
integrated contracts based on net costs with minimum quality standards concerning 
overcrowding, punctuality/reliability and cleanliness, enforced by penalties.  Regulation 
of fares in markets where rail is the dominant mode of travel would be needed.  Variants 
of this regime would be required for new heavy and light rail systems based on Design, 
Build, Operate and Transfer (DBOT) concessions. 
 
However, for the above to happen requires a coalition of policy entrepreneurs at the 
European and national levels who are prepared to overcome the policy barriers erected by 
local politicians, incumbent operators and trade unions.  Despite the best intentions of 
projects such as MARETOPE, there seems little prospect of such a coalition emerging at 
the European level in the immediate future.  
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Table 1: Key indicators for European Urban Bus Systems 
 
 R/TC PK/VK VK/SN TC/VK 
 
Deregulated 
 
 
0.85 
 
16.7 
 
17,987 
 
1.44 
 
Limited Comp. 
  
 
0.47 
 
11.9 
 
19,383 
 
2.26 
 
Regulated 
 
 
0.47 
 
27.0 
 
16,387 
 
2.97 
 
R = Revenue, TC  = Total Cost, PK = Passenger Kms, VK = Vehicle Kms, SN = Staff 
Numbers 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 1997. 
 
 
Table 2:  European Union Railway Performance 
 
 
Operating Performance  Commercial Performance Financial Performance 
 
Vehicles Kms/Staff Nos Traffic Units/Vehicle 
Kms 
Total Rev./Total Cost 
 1994  1997  1994    1997 1994 1997 
State Controlled Firms   2,522  3,183    185     176 0.42 0.49 
Commercial Firms 3,318  3,992    164     161 0.48 0.50 
 
Source: Shires and Preston, 1999. 
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Table 3: Structure of the Bus Industry (% breakdown by revenue) 
 
   
1985 
 
 
National Bus Company (NBC)  28 
(70 subsidiaries) 
Scottish Bus Group (SBG)   6 
(9 subsidiaries) 
London Transport (LT)   13 
 
Metropolitan PTCs   18 
(7 companies) 
Municipal PTCs    10 
(50 companies) 
 
 
 
 
Independents    25 
 
        1999 
 
 
First Group        23 
 
Stagecoach        16 
 
Arriva         16 
 
Go Ahead          7 
  
National Express         6   
 
Other Privatised       10 
 
Publicly Owned         6 
 
Independents        15 
 
Sources: Cole (1998), TAS (1999) 
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Table 4: Structure of the Rail Industry  (% breakdown by revenue) 
 
 
 
1997 
 
National Express Group plc      20% 
(5 Franchises) 
Prism Rail plc                              9% 
(4 Franchises) 
 
MTL Holdings Ltd        9% 
(2 Franchises) 
Stagecoach Holdings plc       8% 
(2 Franchises) 
Go-Ahead Group plc        4% 
(2 Franchises) 
First Bus plc         3% 
(1 Franchise) 
Connex Rail Ltd       14% 
(2 Franchises) 
Virgin Rail Ltd       12% 
(2 Franchises) 
Sea Containers Ltd         6% 
(1 Franchise) 
GB Railways Group plc       2% 
(1 Franchise) 
Great Western Holdings      12% 
(2 Franchises) 
M40 Trains Ltd        1% 
(1 Franchise) 
 
12 Separate Groups  
 
2001 
 
National Express Group plc 29% 
            (9 Franchises) 
 Stagecoach Holdings plc/ 20% 
            Virgin Rail Ltd. 
(4 Franchises) 
First Group plc  15% 
            (3 Franchises) 
Arriva Ltd.    9% 
           (2 Franchises) 
Go-Ahead Group   4% 
           (2 Franchises) 
Connex Rail Ltd  14%* 
(2 Franchises) 
Sea Containers Ltd   6% 
            (1 Franchise) 
GB Railways Group plc  2% 
            (1 Franchise) 
M40 Trains Ltd   1% 
(1 Franchise) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Separate Groups   
 
Based on Knowles (1998) 
*Re-Franchising will see 1 Franchise with around 6% of revenue transfer from Connex to 
Go-Ahead 
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Table 5:  Estimated Net Benefits of Removing Organisational and 
Interoperability Barriers to Passenger Transport at a European Level (BECU) 
 
Organisational Barriers Interoperability Barriers 
Deregulation of Express Coach       1.5 Low Floor Buses & Trams                 1.1 
 Park and Ride Systems                       1.3 
Commercialisation of Rail Passenger 
Services                                         10.0 
Multi Systems HSTS                          1.3 
 Real Time Information                       0.5 
 Links between Heavy & Light Rail    1.5 
Tendering/Franchising of Urban/    6.5 
Regional Public Transport 
Other Measures                                   1.0 
                        TOTAL                 18.0                                                             6.7 
 
Source: Preston,  1999a. 
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Figure 1 Location of Domestic European Transport Sub-Sectors in 1980 and 1997 
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I = Infrastructure, O = Operations, IU = Inter Urban, U=Urban. 
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Figure 2  Organisational forms of public transport services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
           
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: Van de Velde (1999) 
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Figure 3  Location of International European Transport Sectors in 1980 and  2000 - 
Operations 
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P = Passenger, F = Freight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
